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ABSTRACT
The emerging field of outbreak analytics calls attention 
to the need for data from multiple sources to inform 
evidence- based decision making in managing infectious 
diseases outbreaks. To date, these approaches have 
not systematically integrated evidence from social and 
behavioural sciences. During the 2018–2020 Ebola 
outbreak in Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, an 
innovative solution to systematic and timely generation of 
integrated and actionable social science evidence emerged 
in the form of the Cellulle d’Analyse en Sciences Sociales 
(Social Sciences Analytics Cell) (CASS), a social science 
analytical cell. CASS worked closely with data scientists 
and epidemiologists operating under the Epidemiological 
Cell to produce integrated outbreak analytics (IOA), where 
quantitative epidemiological analyses were complemented 
by behavioural field studies and social science analyses 
to help better explain and understand drivers and barriers 
to outbreak dynamics. The primary activity of the CASS 
was to conduct operational social science analyses 
that were useful to decision makers. This included 
ensuring that research questions were relevant, driven by 
epidemiological data from the field, that research could be 
conducted rapidly (ie, often within days), that findings were 
regularly and systematically presented to partners and 
that recommendations were co- developed with response 
actors. The implementation of the recommendations 
based on CASS analytics was also monitored over time, to 
measure their impact on response operations. This practice 
paper presents the CASS logic model, developed through 
a field- based externally led consultation, and documents 
key factors contributing to the usefulness and adaption of 
CASS and IOA to guide replication for future outbreaks.
INTRODUCTION
The 2018–2020 Ebola outbreak in Eastern 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) 
was the second largest in recorded history.1 By 
the time the outbreak was declared over on 
25 June 2020, there had been 3481 confirmed 
cases, including 2299 fatalities, in an area 
affected by a protracted crisis due to long 
standing political tensions and conflicts, and 
widespread historic mistrust in government 
and public authority.2 The DRC is a country 
at high risk of epidemics; at the time of the 
Summary box
 ► During the 2018–2020 Ebola outbreak in Eastern 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, an innovative 
solution to systematic and timely generation of in-
tegrated and actionable social science evidence 
emerged in the form of the Cellulle d’Analyse en 
Sciences Sociales (CASS).
 ► The CASS worked closely with data scientists and 
epidemiologists operating under the Epidemiological 
Cell to produce integrated outbreak analytics (IOA).
 ► IOA is a transdisciplinary approach where quantita-
tive epidemiological analyses, health services and 
systems data, behavioural field studies, social sci-
ence analyses, contextual data (eg, socioeconomic, 
population data) and operational programmes data 
are analysed holistically to help better explain 
and understand drivers and barriers to outbreak 
dynamics.
 ► The CASS conducted rapid, operational social sci-
ence analyses to complement epidemiological, 
health services and programmes data which were 
analysed in an integrated manner and were sys-
tematically presented and used to inform response 
activities and strategies.
 ► The implementation of the recommendations based 
on CASS analytics was monitored over time, to mea-
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10th Ebola outbreak, the Eastern region experienced 
concurrent epidemics of polio, cholera, measles and 
plague.3 4 Coordinating an Ebola response in this chal-
lenging context required decision makers to have situ-
ational awareness of multiple aspects of a dynamic and 
fast- paced public health crisis from which to make timely 
strategic and operational decisions.5 6
The emerging field of outbreak analytics calls atten-
tion to the need for data from multiple sources to inform 
evidence- informed decision making in managing infec-
tious diseases outbreaks.7 8 To date, these approaches 
have not systematically integrated evidence from social 
and behavioural sciences as a core part of integrated 
outbreak analytics (IOA).9 During the 2018–2020 Ebola 
outbreak, an innovative solution to systematic and timely 
generation of integrated and actionable social science 
evidence emerged in the form of the Cellulle d’Analyse 
en Sciences Sociales (CASS), a social science analytics 
cell. CASS was embedded within the national response 
structure and worked closely with data scientists and 
epidemiologists operating under the Epidemiological 
Cell to produce IOA, where quantitative epidemiological 
analyses were complemented by behavioural field studies 
and social science analyses to help better explain and 
understand drivers and barriers to outbreak dynamics. 
CASS delivered 58 integrated studies, which led to 112 
evidence- informed recommendations co- developed with 
response pillars to improve and adapt response interven-
tions and strategies.
This paper details the operational processes of the 
CASS based on an extensive review of CASS documents 
and tools, strategies and reports and a 2- week externally 
led consultation (NG University of Oxford), funded by 
the Wellcome Trust and UK Foreign, Commonwealth 
and Development Office. This consultation included 
interviews with 79 stakeholders from different levels of 
the Ebola outbreak response in the DRC to understand 
their views on key characteristics of the CASS model, 
usefulness and challenges as well as aspects that could 
be improved and what would be needed to replicate 
the model for future outbreaks. The outcome of this 
consultation led to refinements in how CASS achieved its 
outcomes and impact, and informed subsequent CASS 
support in the DRC to COVID-19, cholera, the 11th and 
12th Ebola outbreaks as well as to the Ebola outbreak in 
Guinea (April 2021).10–12
THE ORIGINS OF CASS
The CASS developed organically and in response to 
needs expressed by response actors to better understand 
the determinants of epidemiological trends, transmission 
dynamics and differences across affected communities, 
from a holistic epidemiological, social and behavioural 
perspective. The studies which led to a more formal set 
up of CASS started in October 2018, with a UNICEF- 
deployed social epidemiologist (SEC). In October 2018, 
SEC conducted a qualitative study to better understand 
the situation for pregnant and lactating women who 
were not eligible for the vaccine and not reported by 
vaccination or surveillance teams. This first study directly 
supported response pillars including psychosocial, 
surveillance, vaccination and epidemiological teams to 
better integrate those non- eligible for the vaccine. In 
November 2018, Medair, an Ebola healthcare provider, 
requested support to better understand reasons for non- 
reporting or referral of suspected Ebola cases in one of 
their supported healthcare facilities.13 This request led 
to the first CASS partnership study, a qualitative study 
with healthcare workers and community members to 
better understand barriers to healthcare access. SEC led 
this study and provided training for Medair staff to lead 
future groups. In January 2019, partnerships continued to 
expand and included working with the Infection Preven-
tion and Control- Water Sanitation Hygiene (IPC- WASH) 
pillar and WHO IPC teams to conduct studies to better 
understand perceptions and use of healthcare facilities 
and IPC measures and again, this reinforced a multiactor 
approach to the collection and use of data. The CASS was 
able to rapidly provide evidence and understanding that 
was relevant and adapted, responding to critical ques-
tions. The inclusion of a broad range of response actors, 
including government and non- government organisa-
tions within the CASS studies, reinforced relationships 
with the end line data users, contributing to CASS credi-
bility and trust.
OPERATIONALISATION OF THE CASS DURING THE EBOLA 
OUTBREAK
CASS was set up as an operational analytics service 
embedded within the national Ebola response struc-
ture. Figure 1 presents a programme logic model that 
sets out core activities of the service, together with their 
short- term, medium- term and long- term outcomes. 
Programme inputs were also defined to guide planning 
for future replication of this initiative.
Inputs
Key human and financial resource inputs
A retrospective review of the CASS allowed for identifying 
the resources necessary to replicate the experience in 
future outbreaks and public health crises. This included 
detailing the human resources (multidisciplinary skillset, 
mix of national and international staff, levels of seniority, 
job descriptions, etc), physical resources (office space, 
research resources, etc), financial resources (budget esti-
mates per study, budget estimates for staff posts and by 
location, etc), standard operating procedures, commu-
nications (advocacy documents, branding, etc) and tools 
for delivering analytics and building capacity of the CASS 
teams.
Key strategic inputs
Key features related to the success of the CASS were iden-
tified. These included (1) the importance of senior lead-
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translation and use of evidence in coordination meet-
ings, (3) the strategic positioning of the unit, alongside 
the Epidemiological Cell and under the coordination 
and (4) physical presence at both field and response 
coordination level of the response, to ensure the opera-
tional relevance of key questions addressed by the CASS 
and that both epidemiological and sociobehavioural 
approaches to those could be addressed in concert. The 
CASS team maintained a full- time presence at (local) 
subcoordination- level meetings. This built trust and 
familiarity with the CASS and reinforced the interest of 
multiple stakeholders in the response to request and use 
CASS evidence. Subcoordination, locally based CASS 
teams routinely presented localised data and evidence, 
facilitating the co- development of recommendations 
and uptake of evidence- based decision- making. The 
strategic positioning of the CASS both at subcoordina-
tion and coordination level helped engage with local 
response actors and decision makers, and ensured that 
the evidence could be presented to multiple audiences 
and response pillars (figure 2).
Activities
Conducting operational social science research
The primary activity of the CASS was to conduct opera-
tional social science analyses to orient decision- making 
(see table 1 for examples of CASS studies). CASS research 
questions were prioritised in collaboration with partners 
and Ministry of Health (MoH) local- level and national- 
level leadership as a response to critical unknowns or as a 
complement to epidemiological analyses. Analyses from 
the CASS provided critical evidence on factors influencing 
outbreak dynamics and intervention uptake by location, 
specific groups and over time. CASS studies were rapidly 
conducted, taking 3–15 days from idea development to 
Figure 1 Flow of Cellulle d’Analyse en Sciences Sociales analytics process.
Figure 2 Structure and placement of Cellulle d’Analyse en Sciences Sociales (CASS) teams across the coordination and 
subcoordination structure of the Ebola response.13 The CASS team had full time capacity to cover three subcoordinations and 
their surrounding areas. These were the most recurrent hostpots. Rapid studies conducted in Goma and Bunia were done 
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Table 1 Additional examples of changes and impact of the use of CASS studies during the 2018–2020 Eastern Democratic 
Republic of the Congo Ebola outbreak
Study
Rationale for study, key partners, study aim 
and methods Results/Recommendations
Change and impact on outbreak 
intervention
1 Perceptions of risk among 
pregnant and breastfeeding 
women
(October 2018)18
Rationale: routinely collected surveillance 
data on uptake of the novel Ebola vaccine 
did not include information on pregnant 
or breastfeeding women as they were not 
considered eligible for vaccination at that time
Key partner: MoH, UNICEF, surveillance pillar, 
psychosocial pillar
Study aim: to understand views of pregnant 
and breastfeeding women who had been 
identified as contacts (self- reported) and their 
partners in relation to accessing the novel 
Ebola vaccine
Methods: rapid qualitative study
 ► Women who were not eligible 
for the vaccine reported feeling 
abandoned, not receiving 
psychosocial support or 
surveillance and follow- up 
(compared with their neighbours 
or others who had been contacts). 
Both women and men requested 
that women be allowed the 
vaccine, regardless of the risks to 
the pregnancy as the vaccine was 
being promoted as the best way 
to save one’s life.
 ► Female breastfeeding healthcare 
workers continued to work and 
place themselves at risk, without 
access to the vaccine, while 
others decided independently 
to stop breast feeding (or report 
stopping) to access the vaccine.
1. Surveillance forms were 
adapted to include pregnant and 
breastfeeding status.
2. Vaccination teams began reporting 
daily how many non- eligible 
were not vaccinated: this further 
highlighted the daily number of 
women at risk because of the 
eligibility criteria.
3. Kits were provided to support 
breastfeeding mothers (healthcare 
worker, frontline responder, high- 
risk contact) who wished to stop 
breast feeding and access the 
vaccine.
4. Advocacy to allow pregnant and 
breastfeeding women access to 
the novel Ebola vaccine. This was 
raised to SAGE and, following this, 
the policy was changed in June 
2019.
2 Perceptions of infection 
prevention control (IPC) 
and healthcare services 
measures
(January 2019)19
Rationale: low uptake of recommended IPC 
decontamination practices among local 
communities
Key partner: MoH, IPC pillar, WHO
Study aim: to understand local community 
views on IPC decontamination practices in 
order to inform community engagement and 
improve practice
Methods: qualitative interviews and focus 
group discussions
Community members saw the value 
and benefit of decontamination 
practices. Reluctance to engage with 
decontamination practices was linked 
to the fact that decontamination 
for Ebola was being undertaken by 
unknown external teams in a context 
of significant mistrust. For other 
infectious disease scenarios requiring 
decontamination, local community 
members were used to this being 
conducted at the level of the health 
facilities by local healthcare workers.
1. Guidelines for community 
engagement in IPC (March 2019).
2. Training of 95 local hygienists in 30 
neighbourhoods in all the health 
areas of Beni and 50 others in the 
health facilities of 15 surrounding 
health facilities (July 2019).
3. Recommendation implemented 
and inserted in the strategic 
response plan 4: involve 
communities and families in 
decontamination and in close 
collaboration with the risk 
communication and community 
engagement and psychosocial 
support (PSS) teams.
3 Understanding delays in 
treatment- seeking
(July 2019)20
Rationale: epidemiological data highlighted 
continued long delays in treatment- seeking 
(5–12 days), increasing the risk of mortality of 
those affected by Ebola
Key partner: MoH, Epidemiology Cell, CDC- 
Atlanta
Study aim: to explain the potential causes in 
delays related to treatment- seeking among 
those with symptoms of Ebola
Methods: meta- analysis of existing qualitative 
and quantitative data form CASS studies
Barriers to treatment- seeking were 
largely due to misunderstanding of 
Ebola symptoms (posters and images 
focused on severe rather than more 
common symptoms) as well as fear 
that Ebola Treatment Centres would 
result in death.
1. Development of new 
communications tools (messages 
and images) which include ‘dry’ 
symptoms and make comparisons 
to other known illnesses (now 
included in all communication 
tools).
2. Messages and campaigns focused 
on early treatment- seeking for 
survival.
4 Understanding nosocomial 
transmission 21
Rationale: epidemiological analysis indicated 
that, when a nosocomial transmission 
occurred, there was a greater likelihood of 
further spread
Key partner: IPC- WASH pillar
Study aim: to explain potential reasons and 
factors related to nosocomial infection
Methods: integrated analysis including a 
meta- synthesis of healthcare worker surveys, 
household surveys and qualitative studies 
on healthcare- seeking behaviour integrated 
with epidemiological analysis of transmission 
chains, DHIS2 data and programmes data 
from IPC teams
 ► IPC data highlighted that less than 
half of the healthcare facilities had 
received training.
 ► CASS healthcare worker surveys 
conducted across all response 
locations smaller and harder to 
reach facilities were less likely to 
report having received support.
 ► The majority of healthcare workers 
were not being trained on location 
and did not feel able to stop 
nosocomial transmission due to 
reported lack of training.
 ► Many healthcare workers did 
not feel able to detect a possible 
Ebola case.
 ► Healthcare workers reported 
increased community tensions 
and fear of accusations from 
communities for working for the 
response, which may influence 
willingness to raise an alert.
 ► Traditional practitioners were 
reported as not sufficiently 
involved in the response.
  
1.  New IPC- WASH training to focus 
on smaller healthcare facilities and 
to include practical demonstrations 
and application as a key 
component of the training.
2.  Communication materials 
adapted to better explain and 
communicate on common Ebola 
systems (less visibly severe).
3.  Traditional practitioners were 
included into the IPC- WASH 
pillars across multiple locations, 
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study outputs depending on the question and method-
ology applied (see figure 1 for the CASS process).
Each CASS study had terms of reference (ToR) 
endorsed by the response leadership. As a result, MoH 
and response partners had some ownership of the process 
and in turn, could influence the uptake of recommenda-
tions based on evidence. When a study theme was iden-
tified, the CASS team would develop the ToR and rapid 
tools within 24–48 hours and ensure relevant approvals 
with local and national leadership. ToRs were rapidly 
approved because the analyses were requested and 
required to guide response interventions, and due to 
the close working relationships, which were established 
over time between the full- time field- based CASS teams, 
the MoH and response actors. On average, data collec-
tion was conducted over 2–6 days. Local research teams 
collected data in local languages. Pairs of local researchers 
(one asking and discussing, the second taking notes and 
supporting to probe on questions) collected qualitative 
data. Participants provided informed consent verbally, 
however these were not audio recorded as, in agree-
ment with local research teams, this was often perceived 
as intrusive, especially in a context where distrust of the 
Ebola response was high. Quantitative studies required, 
on average, 5–7 days for data collection.
In- country CASS teams, with periodic support from 
the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC- Atlanta) social and behavioural sciences teams, 
conducted analyses over the course of 5–10 days, using 
Atlas- ti (qualitative data) and Epi Info or SPSS (quantita-
tive data). CASS team leads analysed qualitative studies at 
field locations and validated by local researchers validated 
these analyses prior to these being presented to partners. 
Data analysis to presentation took between 48 hours and 
7 days, depending on the study and data collected.
Team structure, coordination and capacity building
The CASS team consisted of local, national and inter-
national members. Local and national staff were key 
to the CASS’s ability to rapidly conduct studies. These 
researchers were familiar with local culture, community 
and language and were able to rapidly build trust and 
respectfully gain access to households as well as to health-
care facilities and staff. The CASS local research teams 
were operational across the four main subcoordination 
areas at all time. The consistency and presence of local, 
permanent CASS teams at each subcoordination meant 
that relationships were built with the subcoordination 
MoH leadership as well as pillars and implementing part-
ners. The CASS field teams actively participated in daily 
response meetings and presented findings on a weekly 
basis adapted for different audiences. A key CASS priority 
was to reinforce the operational research capacity of the 
Congolese teams. Weekly trainings of the local research 
teams were organised to improve their analytical skills 
(including qualitative and quantitative research method-
ology), as well as their ability to communicate results and 
to build relationships with stakeholders and reinforce the 
use of data. At the end of the outbreak, the local research 
teams were supported to build a small network among 
themselves for future, localised and evidence- based 
programmes and response.
Study
Rationale for study, key partners, study aim 
and methods Results/Recommendations
Change and impact on outbreak 
intervention
5 Factors of risk for children 
under 5 years of age
(multiple studies Octobers 
2018, December 2019, 
March 2020)22
Rationale: children under 5 years of age 
continued to represent 14% of caseloads 
throughout the outbreak; however, limited 
understanding of the factors contributing 
to a greater exposure and infection than 
anticipated.
Key partner: Epidemiology Cell
Study aim: understand the factors (situation, 
behaviours, services use) recurrent among 
children under 5 years of age and drivers 
influencing risk and transmission among small 
children
Methods: integrated analysis using illness 
narratives and verbal autopsies, DHIS2 
analysis (interrupted time series), transmission 
chain analysis, programmes data (IPC data), 
household and healthcare worker surveys, 
epidemiological analysis, no delays in 
treatment- seeking, symptoms and health 
outcomes for children under 5 years of age
 ► CASS analysis of health services 
use data demonstrated increased 
use of healthcare facilities by up 
to 300%–400% for children under 
5 years of age.
 ► IPC data highlighted that 
nosocomial infections were 
more likely in smaller healthcare 
facilities; there the increased use 
of services was likely to cause 
overcrowding and limited capacity 
to stop nosocomial transmission.
 ► Surveillance data found that 
children under 5 years of age 
were less to be listed as contacts 
and, when listed, less likely to be 
followed up.
 ► CASS qualitative data found that 
children continued to receive 
injections and intravenous 
treatments in healthcare facilities, 
that parents reported bed- sharing 
and lack of IPC measures. Parents 
and surveillance teams also 
perceived small children as not 
likely to be contacts and were 
therefore not quick to list them.
1. Communication materials were 
developed to explain the risks 
for children (when they may 
have become a contact) and the 
importance of listing children.
2. Training for PSS and surveillance 
teams were reinforced to increase 
the number of children under 5 
years of age listed as contacts and 
to reinforce follow- up of cases.
This list is not exhaustive. A complete list of CASS studies conducted during the outbreak can be found online.23
; CASS, Cellulle d’Analyse en Sciences Sociales; CDC, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; DHIS2, The District Health Information Software (https://dhis2.org/); IPC- WASH, 
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Ensuring a collaborative ethos and facilitating platform
A key success of the CASS was the collaborative ethos and open 
sharing of all tools, studies and results. This way of working 
provided a shared space to link research leadership, imple-
menting partners and donors. Although hosted, supported 
and championed by UNICEF, the CASS was promoted as 
a service for all response partners in its organisation and 
ownership of results.14 The CASS also sought humanitarian 
and government partners to contribute to its activities via 
data sharing or human resources, for example, via sharing 
healthcare facility data from partners such as Medair, data 
collection support from IRC and deployment of surge 
capacity from CDC- Atlanta and MSF- Epicentre. Hence, the 
CASS provided a platform to bring various actors together 
in order to support transdisciplinary analytics and led to the 
unique opportunity to bridge the gap between the worlds of 
field research and humanitarian practice. CASS presenta-
tions also ensured that response actors remained up- to- date 
with understanding of the outbreak dynamics and changes 
to response interventions and strategies based on evidence, 
creating a space for exchange and collaboration. The CASS 
ethos was perceived to encourage an open discourse on 
challenges and successes which helped to identify gaps (in 
analytics and interventions) and ensured evidence- based 
decision making for the outbreak responders (see table 1).14 
The CASS used the space to obtain feedback and adapted its 
analyses to meet partner requests.
Knowledge mobilisation
CASS routinely presented evidence on a weekly basis at coor-
dination and subcoordination levels. Formats of the pres-
entation included slide deck and short briefs narrative which 
presented adapted and easy to understand evidence summa-
ries for the specific audience with links to the full studies. 
The in- country participants in presentations and recipients 
of briefs included civil society organisations, local MoH, 
national and international non- government organisations 
(NGOs), strategic government leadership and donors. The 
presentations targeted different audiences through adapted 
presentations and ensured that the evidence collected was 
being used to inform ongoing and planned interventions. 
The inclusion of national- level and local- level response 
actors and communities was regarded as very positive to 
ensure co- ownership and to improve support of the inter-
ventions to contain the outbreak. Examples of local- level 
inclusion included1 the presentation of results directly to 
the local- level health leadership who participated in health-
care worker studies2; presenting to local NGOs made up of 
community members who could contribute to the co- de-
velopment of recommendations3; returning to specific 
women’s associations to share and present on how evidence 
was being used (based on their study contributions) and4 via 
local researchers who, from the communities, would share 
back results among youth and other associations.
Co-development and monitoring recommendations
Each CASS study aimed to provide evidence that could 
lead to concrete, operational action for strengthening the 
Ebola response. Subcoordination pillars or implementing 
partners (local actors representing community members) 
co- developed recommendations after each presentation 
of the results. The results presented by the CASS, when 
appropriate, included specific community- based recom-
mendations that had been collected. See table 1 for 
examples of how evidence from CASS analytics impacted 
the outbreak response. To ensure that the evidence was 
being used, between June and August 2019, the CASS 
and the MoH, organised a series of workshops with 
pillars and response actors to identify preferences for the 
development and monitoring of evidence- based recom-
mendations. Following this process, the CASS developed 
a tool (MONITO), available online, to track and follow 
implementation of the co- developed recommendations. 
Recommendations and actions were tracked by study, by 
location and by pillar or actor.15 CASS local research teams 
in each subcoordination were responsible for following 
up recommendations and collecting documentation to 
demonstrate its application. CASS presented regular 
updates on progress against recommendations based on 
the MONITO. The bilateral exchanges and discussions 
with pillars supported implementation of the co- devel-
oped recommendations. MONITO highlights the use 
of CASS analyses to inform response interventions and 
the impact of using integrated social sciences evidence in 
outbreak response. Over the 23 months of the outbreak, 
the CASS was able to track 112 recommendations that 
were adopted and followed up using the MONITO. At 
the end of the outbreak, 86% of recommendations had 
been completely (63%) or partially (23%) implemented.
Short-term, medium-term and long-term outcomes of CASS 
activities
The overarching long- term goal of the CASS was to 
contribute to a swift end to the Ebola outbreak by inte-
grating epidemiological analyses with evidence on social 
and behavioural perspectives and drivers to better under-
stand outbreak dynamics and inform response strate-
gies and activities. Several short- term and medium- term 
outcomes identified as part of the consultations are 
presented in the programme logic model (see figure 3). 
Key immediate outcomes of CASS activities include the 
rapid production of systematic, operational, ethical and 
trustworthy evidence based on the needs of the response 
and targeted, tailored action- oriented recommendations 
to inform response activities. The collaborative ethos of 
CASS operations was key to build trust among partners 
and achieve its success. In this way, the CASS became 
institutionalised as part of the response and gained legit-
imacy. This legitimacy enabled the CASS to influence 
change at local and strategic levels. Recommendations 
were more likely to be seen as credible and relevant and 
to be acted on. CASS recognition within UNICEF, WHO 
and the MoH, and participation in the strategy planning, 
was perceived as critical for its credibility. The participa-
tory partnership with the MoH and the Epidemiological 
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the quality of epidemiological and social sciences data 
collection tools and of the analyses conducted. An inter-
mediate outcome of the establishment of the CASS is 
it seeks to better understand broader health dynamics 
influencing the Ebola outbreak and community health 
outcomes resulting from the outbreak. The CASS also 
created space for the integration and use of DHIS2 data 
on health services use and health outcome reports from 
healthcare facilities across the country on a monthly 
basis. This integration addresses the critical need to 
understand preoutbreak healthcare- seeking behaviours 
and health outcomes which take concurrently within 
an outbreak. For example, understanding the relation-
ships between the free- healthcare policy applied during 
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the Eastern DRC Ebola outbreak, increased healthcare 
services use and increased risks for nosocomial infection. 
The CASS and Epidemiological Cell facilitated system-
atic integrated outbreak analytics (IOA), which aims 
to understand and describe epidemiological findings 
through the social, environmental behavioural drivers 
and barriers that influence outbreak dynamics and the 
impacts of outbreaks on communities. During the stake-
holder and modelling process, this approach was recog-
nised as creating a richer understanding of the outbreak’s 
dynamics and making both epidemiological and social 
sciences evidence more useful.
WHERE IS CASS NOW?
Since the end of the North Kivu outbreak, the CASS has 
been active in four events: three in the DRC (Ebola in 
Equateur province, cholera and COVID-19) and one 
in Guinea (Ebola). These experiences demonstrate the 
transferability of the model and its potential for expan-
sion to respond to different disease scenarios. CASS’s 
response to the Equateur Ebola outbreak (2020) was a 
natural extension of the support provided in the Eastern 
region. For this event, IOA as an approach to evidence 
generation was successful, with 86 new recommenda-
tions produced of which 58% in November 2020 had 
been fully or partially applied). In the DRC, COVID-19 
presented a new scenario for CASS response. CASS 
worked to bring in additional data sources to extend the 
integration of different perspectives, combining social, 
behavioural and health services analyses with epidemi-
ological trends, markets and context analyses (political 
events and conflict).16 A key focus of CASS research has 
been on providing evidence of the negative impacts 
of COVID-19 Public Health and Social Measures on 
communities, notably focusing on the socioeconomic 
and sexual and reproductive health, nutrition and safety 
and security on women and girls, and aiming to influ-
ence and change response strategies.17 The adaptation 
has, however, presented its own challenges, in part, due 
to the scale of the needs (eg, the impact of the increase of 
the exchange has had on communities which cannot be 
addressed at the local level), the dispersion of the disease 
and the prioritisation of limited funds for the biomed-
ical response excluding the assessment of socioeconomic 
impacts of COVID-19 on populations. The DRC CASS 
continues to have the support of the MoH and has hosted 
workshops supported by the MoH COVID-19 leader-
ship to bring together different actors to understand 
the impacts of COVID-19 and identify opportunities to 
mitigate them. CASS teams have continued to provide 
routine support via presentations and coaching on the 
use of key study results, lessons learnt and supported 
strategies to replicate similar approaches both at a global 
and regional level. In the DRC, the CASS has started 
setting up IOA for cholera outbreak response in the East.
The 2021 Guinea Ebola outbreak provided opportu-
nity for the CASS model to be replicated in an integrated 
way from the outset. An IOA cell was set up, supported 
by the same partners and experts with the DRC experi-
ence. Based on the success of the DRC model, the cell 
structure (ToR) was rapidly approved and integrated 
into the MoH coordination and response within weeks 
of the outbreak, and integrated analyses to support the 
response were presented from immediately thereafter. 
The MoH and the Agence Nationale de Sécurité sanitaire 
in Guinea led and WHO, UNICEF, CDC, IFRC and MSF- 
Epicentre, including specific deployments supported via 
DRC CASS leadership, staffed the cell. With support of 
Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network and other 
partnerships, mechanisms are being identified to repli-
cate similar structures for future outbreaks.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we describe the CASS as a successfully 
applied good practice service for integrated, opera-
tional analytics in outbreak response. A wide range of 
stakeholders consulted in the development of this work 
recognised CASS practices and technical guidance as 
innovative and successful in changing the way analytics 
are conducted and used in outbreaks.
The CASS model evolved organically in response to a 
critical gap in understanding of outbreak dynamics in 
an integrated way as well as to a need to bring outbreak 
response actors together for improved use of evidence 
in decision- making. Its success requires availability or 
capacity to collect data from different sources, buy- in from 
leadership, response teams working towards a common 
goal and a collaborative ethos of partners interested 
in an evidence- based approach to outbreak response. 
Uptake and effective use of evidence to inform response 
actions remains a challenge. The documentation of all 
tools, training materials as well as question banks, lessons 
learnt and hands on available support from CASS teams 
has been made available to actors working in outbreak 
response. In this way, others can access the CASS model 
and ways of working and adapt it for different contexts 
and outbreak scenarios, to generate and use integrated 
outbreak analytics for more effective response to public 
health emergencies.
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